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Admiral Quast, Mr Chairman, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, 
I am delighted to be here with you today. My organisation, Transparency International, is 
the leading not-for-profit organisation in the world that is dedicated to fighting corruption.  
We are passionate about building integrity and addressing corruption risk across the 
globe.  Our objective is to improve living standards and security for ordinary citizens.  
Work in the Defence and Security sectors is an important part of that process, so I am 
particularly pleased to be with you today.  
 
I had the honour of speaking to this conference two years ago.  At that time, the 
collaboration between TI and NATO was only eighteen months old but was showing good 
results, including from work in Bosnia, Ukraine, Norway and Croatia. There is no doubt 
any longer that this work has immense potential  - the progress in countries such as 
Ukraine, Bulgaria and Afghanistan has shown that.  Now, after two years more - with 
numerous countries participating - we have a different challenge.  The challenge is to 
scale up this work from being a great foundation to being part of the mainstream 
structures of NATO.  
 
In most walks of life, such transitions are hard to do. Think of taking an innovative design 
and turning it into an industrially successful product. Think of taking a new venture from 
the initial idea to venture capital backing.  90% of such transitions fail.  
 
This is the subject of my speech to you today.  I want to focus on three aspects of making 
the transition into a capability that is a mainstream, regular part of NATO structure: 
• Being successful and being seen to be successful is the first pre-requisite. 
What are the lessons from around the world on being successful in tackling 
corruption?  And how do we best demonstrate the success so far in defence and 
security? 
• The second is the need for mainstream resources and mainstream 
processes - building counter corruption capability into regular NATO processes.  
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• And the third is to emphasise and integrate BI!s contribution to Afghanistan.  
Afghanistan is at the centre of NATO!s concerns, and counter-corruption capability 
is not just a useful bit of better governance, it is absolutely central to success in 
your mission.  Some people see this, but I believe that most in NATO do not: You 
must pick up and use BI as part of the transition thinking; and through this BI can 
grow to maturity and be central to NATO!s doctrine. 
 
[Theme 1: Corruption can be tackled successfully] 
• People are so often pessimistic about corruption - arguing that it will always be with 
us, so why bother?  We at TI make no apology for constantly raising awareness of 
corruption as a major problem.  Of course it will always be a problem; it is 
fundamentally about unfair distribution of resources.  Human nature being what it is, 
this is an eternal challenge. 
• But nations, companies and specific sectors of society can and do succeed in 
tackling corruption.  
• A wide range of countries has made progress in control of corruption during the last 
ten years.  Let me show you one of only three slides I am going to use in this talk.  It 
plots control of corruption, as measured by the World Bank Governance indicators on 
a scale from 0 (very poor) to 100 (excellent), from 1998 to 2009, for a wide range of 
countries.  Countries as diverse as Turkey, Ghana and Poland show significant 
progress over the last decade. 
• I am happy to say the same holds true for some of the countries that have 
experienced major conflict.  Using the same data source, this second slide plots the 
same metric for ten such countries.  Look at Serbia, or Georgia, or Colombia, or 
Rwanda.  I am not trying to show you that it is easy, or argue that specific anti-
corruption policies drove the difference on their own. And I am making a point by only 
showing those countries where the metric has improved.  I am simply seeking to 
convince you that progress can and does happen, and that it can happen in tough 
unpromising environments.  This is directly relevant to the situation in Afghanistan. 
• Similar progress can be seen in other sectors of society and in the private sector.  I 
don!t have time here to talk you through examples, but let me mention two: the global 
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construction industry, and the oil and extractive sector, where companies and 
governments have been collaborating together now for fifteen years and there is solid 
tangible appreciation that progress is being made. 
• And this brings me to this conference.  We all know that corruption in defence and 
security is a major issue. The paradigm for a long time has been that defence needs 
to be shrouded in secrecy: that Defence & Security institutions can make their 
decisions outside of the public gaze and without regard to the consequences for the 
public.  This is deeply false – last months events in Tunisia and Egypt point to that.  
But it is also false because many within defence establishments are determined to 
drive for greater openness and trust. 
• Let me show you a very useful tool that illustrates this.  This next and last slide is our 
"typology! of the different sorts of corruption risk that may be encountered in defence 
and security organisations.  It shows 29 different risk areas, ranging from those of a 
political nature, through personnel, finance and operations areas to procurement.  TI 
has been using this framework with Defence Ministers and their armed forces chiefs – 
and they engage fully and constructively. Nations find this framework to be very 
helpful and we work through it with them to identify those areas that matter for them, 
and which of those areas are amenable to corrective measures.  You can hardly 
believe how much enthusiasm this generates: almost for the first time ever, the 
subject is brought out of the shadows and discussed objectively, openly and 
constructively. 
 
Let me conclude on this first theme: It IS possible for countries to succeed in anti-
corruption efforts, even in conflict environments.  It IS possible for Defence and Security 
organisations to make significant progress in countering corruption. This is true for a wide 
range of nations, not just for a particular few – as the initiative has demonstrated in 
applications from Norway to Afghanistan. It IS possible for NATO successfully to engage 
with NGOs to help advance this agenda. This is a strong, positive situation to be in, and it 
needs NATO nations, particularly allies - to be confident and robust in pushing this 
agenda to become mainstream in NATO. 
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[Theme 2 – Counter-corruption initiatives need resources and integration into the 
mainstream if they are to succeed] 
• Let me turn to my second theme.  We do see real progress in tackling corruption in 
many countries and sectors of society.  But the landscape is also littered with failures. 
• There are three main reasons in nations. First, political will and/or public support is 
often not sustained. Second, many initiatives start off being too ambitious and/or ill 
thought out.  But most of all there is poor management and integration of the overall 
Programme.  They may have insufficient funds. People may not be willing to risk their 
career by going into a new political initiative. It may be too difficult to work across the 
many organisational and national boundaries. It may be hard to change established 
processes to accommodate the new counter-corruption measures. Scaling up is 
hard to do. 
• While much progress has been made, this NATO initiative is one such potentially 
fragile flower. It actually has been very fast and very successful so far, gaining 
authority and rolling out excellent counter corruption training and change leadership in 
many countries including Afghanistan since its launch in late 2007.  But it is 
nonetheless facing an important step-change that may succeed or fail. 
• Let me share with you my worries about resources. First, despite all the strong words 
of support and appreciation, the BI Trust Fund has been rather unsuccessful in 
raising more than relatively small sums of money. Funding means prioritisation, 
and it seems to me that NATO has not yet given a strong priority to this work. Second, 
for reasons of national economy, the UK has had to cut back on the resources it can 
put at the disposal of the initiative through the UK Defence Academy. Third, despite 
the recently recognised importance of corruption as a strategic issue for the mission in 
Afghanistan, it has proved very difficult so far for NATO or ISAF to release funds for 
developing the counter-corruption effort there.  Finally, within NATO, this is still a 
cottage industry, and it is working thanks to the heroic work of just a few International 
Staff officers, with negligible organisational and logistical support. 
• I am also concerned that integrating BI tools and processes into mainstream NATO is 
going slowly. We have seen one major advance - the main five-day counter-corruption 
course has become formally accredited within NATO that General Abrial spoke of.  
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This is a big achievement, and I am pleased that my TI colleague Air Commodore 
Alan Waldron is formally the CoOPR of the course (Official with Prime Responsibility 
for the course).  However, we have not yet seen progress in amending the 
mainstream NATO processes to incorporate progress and plans on limiting corruption 
risk. BI will die without this happening.  I hope one of the outcomes of this second 
Monterey conference will be to set in hand action in modifying formal NATO structures 
to bring BI into the mainstream of NATO activity following the decisions taken by 
NATO leaders at the Lisbon Summit. 
 
[Theme 3 – BI has vital application in Afghanistan and in conflict environments] 
• Finally, Afghanistan.  It is vital that ISAF commanders understand the issue of 
corruption in-theatre and that their plans include counter-corruption elements.  
Hitherto this has very rarely been the case.  This is one of the reasons for ISAF being 
seen as complicit in corruption stories.  Our work in pre-deployment training , in 
writing doctrine, and in doing post-deployment debriefs of ISAF troops make this 
abundantly clear.  General Petraeus has been vocal on this, but there is little 
capability out of theatre to support and assist. 
• Let me give you an example. Nations and ISAF needs to be much more attentive to 
the effects of the large flows of money that come with international military 
interventions.  How the money is spent actively impacts the success of the campaign, 
as General Petraeus has so clearly spelt out in his Counter-Insurgency guidance to 
ISAF troops. The experience of our team working on Afghanistan and almost 
everyone we talk to is that hardly anyone in the military contracting world, or their 
operational commanders, knows how to operationalise the leverage money and 
contracting bring in support of the campaign rather than making the corruption picture 
worse.  Intelligent direction of contracting should build local capability and popular 
support rather that the reverse, which plays into the hands of the insurgency. 
• And another example: In the coming transition phase, the transition and re-integration 
negotiations must include a framework for considering corruption issues in the country 
and their impact on the long-term outcome.  State-builders may see their work as 
inevitably requiring an acceptance of a high level of corruption among some of the 
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parties, but the consequences, such as the corrosive effects of deepening organised 
crime, or public distrust, must be considered much more rigorously than they are 
today. This is not yet part of the dialogue.. 
• One final example: The work that BI is doing in counter-corruption training of ANSF 
senior personnel in Kabul is outstanding.  Yet it is being done on a shoestring. My 
own British TI colleagues, who are the real subject matter experts in the BI initiative, 
have to go out with no insurance support from NATO. This is a tribute to their 
commitment, but is unsustainable and unsafe. 
• Last month we co-hosted a conference on ways that the UN, ISAF, NATO and nations 
can better help Afghanistan on corruption. I hope we can discuss the main 
recommendations in the body of this conference. 
• At a practical level, the BI initiative desperately needs to be scaled up to be the Centre 
of Excellence across NATO in tackling corruption in intervention situations like 
Afghanistan, as well as in nations in more normal circumstances.  I deeply hope that 
this can be a recommendation and an action from this conference..  NATO must show 
its faith in this new competence by building capability and this Centre of Excellence. 
Let me conclude.  First, the positive on the report card: the BI initiative - and NATO!s 
cooperation with us at TI – has been a tremendous success so far and is delivering 
world-class tools to tackle a problem that many have believed in the past to be too 
difficult or too sensitive to tackle.  This success is paralleled in other related initiatives, for 
example by the major defence contractors.  The negative on the report card is that we are 
not yet making the transition from being an excellent foundation to mainstream structures 
in NATO.  This has to happen within the next two years.  If it does not, I believe the 
lesson of history is that it will die. 
 
It is on that note of concern that I should like to end my remarks to this conference.   
Between all of us, we need to ensure that this fantastic foundational NATO initiative 
makes a successful transition, and becomes an integral part of NATO structures.  It 
needs your help to achieve this. 
 
Thank You 
